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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TRACY J. FLORENCE,
*

Petitioner
*

vs •
WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
SERVICES,
Respondent

Case No. 20000700-CA
Priority No. 7

*
*

ARGUMENT
I.

Introduction
In its response to Florence's opening brief, the Workforce

Appeals Board (hereinafter "the Board") ignores established
principles of statutory interpretation and rests its case on an
ambiguous Department of Labor (DOL) Program Letter,

The Board's

suggestion that general language in the federal statute supports
its position, when the specific wording of 26 U.S.C. §
3304(a)(15) limits offsets to retirement benefit programs, not
disability programs, ignores established rules of statutory
interpretation.

Moreover, the Board ignores case law from this

court supporting the conclusion that the DOL Program Letter is
neither controlling nor persuasive.

1

II.

The Plain Language of the Federal Statute Limits Offsets To
Retirement, Not Disability Insurance, Benefits

This court has made clear that the starting point for
interpreting a federal statute is with the plain language of the
statute.

Nelson

v. Betit,

937 P.2d 1298, 1303 (Utah App. 1997).

The Utah Supreme Court has observed that "where statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look
beyond the same to divine legislative intent.

Rather, we are

guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed
according to its plain language."

Brinkerhoff

v. Forsyth,

7 99

P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989).
The Board fails to come to grips with Florence's argument
that section 3304(a)(15) is concerned with retirement benefits.
The closest the Board comes to addressing the plain language of
Section 3304(a)(15) is its contention that Florence's SSDI
benefits "fall within the plain meaning of the statutory words,
'or any other similar periodic payment which is based on the
previous work of such individual...'" Brief of Respondent, at 11.
In reaching this conclusion, the Board has unhinged the phrase
"or any other similar periodic payment which is based on the
previous work of such individual" from the preceding language of
the statute which contains very specific references to retirement
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§ 423(a)(1) See Addendum.

In contrast, Social Security

retirement benefits, or "old-age insurance benefits," are
available to every individual who:
1.
Is a fully insured individual;
2.
Has attained age 62;and
3.
Has filed application for old-age
insurance benefits or was entitled to
disability insurance benefits for the month
preceding the month in which he attained
retirement age...
42 U.S.C. § 402(a).

See Addendum.

Title II of the Social Security Act contemplates two
separate programs: one that begins when an individual reaches
retirement age, currently age 65, and one that begins when a
person is found disabled, which can even occur when the
individual is a minor child.
permanent.

The first, old-age insurance, is

Once an individual reaches retirement age and

qualifies, benefits cannot be terminated.

The second, SSDI,

is not permanent; benefits can be terminated at any time.

The

statute provides for termination of benefits upon a showing
that the physical or mental impairment upon which disability
was based, "has ceased, does not exist, or is not
disabling..." provided there is evidence of medical
improvement and the ability to perform substantial gainful
activity.

42 U.S.C. § 423 (f). See Addendum.
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20 C , F. R. § § 404.310 e t.

This court was correct in holding in
v. Industrial

Comm'n.,

Dept.

Of Empl.

Sec,

Harrington
942 P.2d 961, 964

(Utah App. 1997) that Social Security old-age benefits are
subject to the offset provisions of section 3304(a)(15), since
they fall squarely into the classification of retirement
programs contemplated by the federal statute, including
pensions and annuities.

Social Security retirement shares the

same characteristic of permanence and entitlement by law that
is ordinarily associated with a pension or annuity.

That is

not the case with Social Security disability insurance which
is a transitory benefit, entirely dependent upon the physical
or mental ability of a recipient, which can change from year
to year.
Even assuming that the plain language of the statute were
not clear, and that resort to legislative history were
necessary, the available history supports Florence's position.
She pointed out in her opening brief that Congress intended to
address the problem of persons "who had actually withdrawn
from the workforce" and were receiving unemployment.

Brief of

the Petitioner, at 22. The available federal legislative
history shows section 3304(a)(15) was aimed specifically at
public and private pensions, railroad retirement annuities,

6

Social Security retirement benefits and military retirement.
The Board has failed to point to anything in the legislative
history to support its position that Congress intended to
include SSDI benefits.
III. The Board's Position Is An Impermissible Expansion of
the Federal Statute
Having failed to show from the plain language of the
federal statute that Congress intended to include SSDI in the
offset provisions, the Board next suggests that its position
is justified by the state statute which makes reference to
"disability retirement pay."

The discussion previously has

shown that Social Security disability and Social Security
retirement are distinctly different programs.

Joinder of the

two terms in the state statute to produce "disability
retirement" creates a patent ambiguity.

Does the term

"disability retirement" mean benefits commencing when someone
is found disabled or does it mean benefits commencing when
retirement age is reached?
occur?

Or does it mean both events must

The Board does not address this thorny issue, choosing

instead to blithely presume that the state statute is
conclusive.

7

Despite the inherent ambiguity, the Board points to
nothing to support its conclusion that "disability retirement"
means SSDI.

The Board identifies no definitions, no

legislative history, no case law, nothing with which to
support its bare conclusion.

Far more is required of a

litigant who proposes to interpret a federal statute so as to
include a program not clearly intended by Congress to be
subject to the offset.
The Board goes on to argue that even if support for its
position cannot be found in the plain language of section
3304(a)(15), it is justified by this court's holding in
Harrington

v.

Industrial

Comm'n.,

at 965, that a state may

broaden the definition of its deduction of pension payments
beyond the conditions in which the deduction is required under
Federal law..."

Brief of Respondent, at 12. The court's

opinion cannot be read as allowing wholesale redefining of the
offset provisions beyond the intent of Congress as expressed
in federal law.

Even the Board recognizes that the benefit

programs which are subject to deduction are limited, since it
agrees that temporary disability insurance benefits cannot be
deducted from a recipient's unemployment compensation.

It is

more reasonable to say that a state may broaden its definition
8

to include types of retirement programs not specifically
described by section 3304(a)(15) but may not use a definition
that sweeps up benefits, such as SSDI, when there is no basis
for concluding that Congress intended they be included.
The Board's argument at page 12 of its brief that SSDI
payments are based on years of service and, therefore, must be
considered retirement income fails both factually and
logically.

The Board asserts that Mr. Eimers testified at

Florence's hearing that the benefits she was receiving from
Social Security were "based on her own earnings and at least
in part on her years of credited service."

Brief of

Respondent, at 12. Actually, Eimers' testified that the
benefits were based on quarters of coverage and that an entire
year's worth of coverage could be earned in one week of a
quarter.

T2-11-12. Moreover, Eimers testified unequivocally

that a hypothetical 35-year-old disabled person receiving SSDI
would "definitely not" be receiving retirement income.

T2-14.

The Board's argument also fails, because it is premised
on the assumption that the language in section 3304(a)(15)
referring to "any other similar periodic payment which is
based on the previous work of such individual..."
SSDI benefits.

includes

As has been shown above, this premise is

9

faulty.

The quoted language applies to specific types of

retirement programs, based on an individual's previous work.
If it is read as encompassing every type of program based on
an individual's previous work, then it would logically include
temporary disability insurance and workers compensation,
programs which the Board agrees are excluded.
IV.

The DOL Program Letter is Not Controlling in This Case
After passing over Florence's argument that the specific,

plain language of section 3304(a)(15) limits it to retirement
programs, the Board next presumes an ambiguity in the federal
statute, thereby permitting consideration of extraneous
sources, in this case, a Department of Labor Program Letter.
Brief of the Respondent, at 12. The Board makes this
assertion without first discussing this court's holding in
Nelson

v. Betit,

937 P.2d at 1305 concerning the deference

owed to an agency's interpretation of a statute.

The court

approved of principles established in other cases that only
agency interpretations promulgated and published as
regulations enjoy the full force and effect of law.

An agency

policy in the form of an action transmittal, or in this case a
program letter, is interpretive, rather than substantive, and
is not entitled to the force and effect of law, nor is it

10
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Amounts equal to other types of disability
compensation such as temporary disability
insurance and worker's compensation
(including Black Lung benefits), which are
not payable as retirement or pension payment,
also are not required by Section 3304(a)(15),
FUTA, to be deducted. (Emphasis added).
It has been shown previously that SSDI benefits are temporary,
not permanent.

Moreover, they are insurance benefits.

Thus,

the term "temporary disability insurance" in the Program
Letter can reasonably be read as referring to SSDI.

Moreover,

SSDI is not payable as a retirement or pension payment.

In

sum, the language used in the DOL Program Letter actually
supports the argument that SSDI benefits are excluded.
After excluding temporary disability insurance benefits
from the offset provisions of Section 3304(a)(15), the Program
Letter then introduces the ambiguous term "disability
retirement benefits" in a list of "programs or plans...
subject to the pension offset requirements..."

Even if this

ambiguous language can be read in the way suggested by the
Board, it should not be considered binding on the court, since
it is not reasonable and consistent with the overall design
and purpose of the federal unemployment compensation program.
The best available federal legislative history shows that the
design and purpose of section 3304(a)(15) was to apply an
12
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CONCLUSION
Florence has established that the federal statute in
question does not apply so as to require an offset of her SSDI
benefits during the brief time she was receiving unemployment
compensation.

The Board has not presented persuasive reasons

for inserting disability insurance into the federal statute,
when well-established principles of statutory interpretation
direct a conclusion that Congress intended the statute to
apply only to retirement benefits.

For this reason, the court

should reverse the Board and find there is no overpayment.
XJJ

lis o^__Tday
cJ^
DATED this
of-^ecember, 2 000.

fichael E. Bulson
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following on this^2^_ day of December, 2000:
Lorin R. Blauer
Attorney for Workforce Appeals Board
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244

Michael E. Bulson
Attorney for Petitioner
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§ 401.

Trust Funds

(a) Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund

There is hereby created on the books of the Treasury of the
United States a trust fund to be known as the "Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance Trust Fund". The Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund shall consist of the securities held by the
Secretary of the Treasury for the Old-Age Reserve Account and the
amount standing to the credit of the Old-Age Reserve Account on
the books of the Treasury on January 1, 1940, which securities and
amount the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to
transfer to the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust
Fund, and, in addition, such gifts and bequests as may be made as
provided in subsection (i)(l) of this section, and such amounts as
may be appropriated to, or deposited in, the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance Trust Fund as hereinafter provided. There is
hereby appropriated to the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, and for
each fiscal year thereafter, out of any moneys in the Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, amounts equivalent to 100 per centum of—
(1) the taxes (including interest, penalties, and additions to
the taxes) received under subchapter A of chapter 9 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (and covered into the Treasury)
which are deposited into the Treasury by collectors of internal
revenue before January 1, 1951; and
(2) the taxes certified each month by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue as taxes received under subchapter A of
chapter 9 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 which are
166

<l.
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I IItl

deposited into the ] ; •. a-ury by collectors of internal revenue
after December 31, 1950, and before January 1, 1953, with
respect to assessn^^ 1 ^f siich taxes made before January 1,
1951; and
(3) the taxes imposed by
cei A of chaptf
e
Internal Revenue Code of 19
respect to wa?w
fined in section 1426 of such
*nd by chapter 21 (other
than sections 3101(b) am' ~
Title 26 with respect to
+1
wages (as defined in section DI^I u
° 26) reported to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue p
to section 1420(c)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1Q"
—r 31, 1950,
or to the Secretary of the Treasur
>ursuant to
subtitle F of Title 26 after Decern
<*rmined by
the Secretary of the Treasure h\
-ates of
tax under such subchapter or cnapici z.i v
• -i^nv
3101(b) and 3111(b)) to such wages, whi
certified by the Secretary of Health and Hun
MCCS on the
basis of the records of wages established a * maintained b>
such Secretary in accordance with such reports, .ess the
amounts specified in clause < :» of subsection (b) ol thi* sccuon,
and
^j

t

^e

taxes

imp0seci ^

o^.^^u^'t^. ,

ol

Ui\KV

(

Internal Revenue Code of 1939, with respect to self-em; iovmcp:
income (as defined in section 481 of such Code), and by chapter
2 (other than section 1401(b)) of Title 26 with respect to selfemployment income (as defined in section 1402 of Title 26)
reported to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on tax
returns under such subchapter or to the Secretary of the Trea
sury or his delegate on tax returns under subtitle F of Title 26,
as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury by applying the
applicable rate of tax under such subchapter or chapter (other
than section 1401(b)) to such self-employment income, which
self-employment income shall be certified by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services on the basis of the records of selfemployment income established and maintained by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with such
returns, less the amounts specified in clause (2) of si ibsec^V(b) of this section.
The amounts appropriated by clauses (3) and (4) of this subsection
shall be transferred from time to time from the general fund in the
Treasury to the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust
Fund, and the amounts appropriated by clauses (1) and (2) of
subsection (b) of this section shall be transferred from time to time
from the general fund in the Treasury to the Federal Disability
Insurance Trust Fund, such amounts to be determined on the basis
of estimates by the Secretary of the Treasury of the taxes, specified
in clauses (3) and (4) of this subsection, paid to or deposited into
the Treasury; and proper adjustments shall be made in amounts
167
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subsequently transferred to the extent prior estimates were in
excess of or were less than the taxes specified in such clauses (3)
and (4) of this subsection. All amounts transferred to either Trust
Fund under the preceding sentence shall be invested by the Managing Trustee in the same manner and to the same extent as the other
assets of such Trust Fund. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, in any case in which the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the assets of either such Trust Fund would otherwise be
inadequate to meet such Fund's obligations for any month, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall transfer to such Trust Fund on the
first day of such month the amount which would have been transferred to such Fund under this section as in effect on October 1,
1990; and l and such Trust Fund shall pay interest to the general
fund on the amount so transferred on the first day of any month at
a rate (calculated on a daily basis, and applied against the difference between the amount so transferred on such first day and the
amount which would have been transferred to the Trust Fund up to
that day under the procedures in effect on January 1, 1983) equal to
the rate earned by the investments of such Fund in the same month
under subsection (d) of this section.
(b) Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund

There is hereby created on the books of the Treasury of the
United States a trust fund to be known as the "Federal Disability
Insurance Trust Fund". The Federal Disability Insurance Trust
Fund shall consist of such gifts and bequests as may be made as
provided in subsection (i)(l) of this section, and such amounts as
may be appropriated to, or deposited in, such fund as provided in
this section. There is hereby appropriated to the Federal Disability
Insurance Trust Fund for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, and
for each fiscal year thereafter, out of any moneys in the Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, amounts equivalent to 100 per centum
of—
(1)(A) Vi of 1 per centum of the wages (as defined in section
3121 of Title 26) paid after December 31, 1956, and before
January 1, 1966, and reported to the Secretary of the Treasury
or his delegate pursuant to subtitle F of Title 26, (B) 0.70 of 1
per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after December
31, 1965, and before January 1, 1968, and so reported, (C) 0.95
of 1 per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after December 31, 1967, and before January 1, 1970, and so reported, (D)
1.10 per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after December 31, 1969, and before January 1, 1973, and so reported, (E)
1.1 per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after December 31, 1972, and before January 1, 1974, and so reported, (F)
1.15 per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after December 31, 1973, and before January 1, 1978, and so reported, (G)
1.55 per centum of the wages (as so defined) paid after Decem168

42 §401a
Omitted
long term commitments to old-age, sur
vivors, and disability insurance programs, appointed personnel and provided for their compensation, required a
report of the findings and recommendations of the Council to be submitted to
the Secretary of the Board of Trustees of
the abovementioned Trust Funds not later than Jan. 1, 1959, at which time the
Council terminated, provided for subsequent Advisory Councils to be appointed
in 1963, 1966, and every fifth year thereafter and to submit reports to Congress,

§ 402.

PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
qjueu additional information be
.ej. in these reports, was omitted
the Code in view of the termi
nation of the initial Advisory Council on
submission of their report not later than
Jan. 1, 1959, the repeal of subsec. (e) by
Pub L. 89-97, Title I, § 109(b), July 30,
1965, 79 Stat. 340, which provided for
the subsequent Advisory Councils, and
the obsolescence of subsec. (f), which
provided for additional information in
reports to Congress, upon the repeal of
subsec (e)

uu tif»t iiiiiiJ survhors insurance benefit payments

(a) oicl-age insurance benefits
Every individual who—
(1) is a fully insured individual (as defined in section 414(a)
of this title),
(2) has attained age 62, and
(3) has filed application for old-age insurance benefits or was
entitled to disability insurance benefits for the month preceding
the month in which he attained retirement; age (as defined in
section 416(/) of this title),
shall be entitled to an old-age iiisuran.ee bend J loi . i I.
iL
beginning with—
(A) in the case of an individual who has attained retirement
age (as defined in section 416(1) of this title), the first month in
which such individual meets the criteria specified in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), or
(B) in the case of an individual who has attained age 62, but
has not attained retirement age (as defined in section 416(/) of
this title), the first month throughout which such individual
meets the criteria specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) (if in that
month he meets the criterion specified in paragraph (3))
and ending with the month preceding the month in which he dies.
Except as provided in subsection (q) and subsection (w) of this
section, such individual's old-age insurance benefit for any month
shall be equal to his primary insurance amount (as defined in
section, 415(a) of this title) for such month.
(b) Wife's insurance benefits

(1) The wife (as defined in section 416(b) of this title) and every
divorced wife (as defined in section 416(d) of this title) of an
individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, if such
wife or such divorced wife—
(A) has filed application loi \\iit'"» •• -.i inn in i hei'n fits,
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tal disability and 45 percent permanent
partial disability to claimant was not
controlling upon Secretary in proceedings by claimant to establish a period of
disability under § 416(i) of this title,
since each fact-finding agency is entitled
to make its own decision upon the evidence before it. Stuckey v. Flemming,
D.C.Or.1959, 188 F.Supp. 1.
That one seeking to establish period of
disability under this subchapter was determmed to have total disability by
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner of state was not binding upon Secretary. Carpenter v. Flemming, D.C.W.Va.
1959, 178 F.Supp. 791.
r
*^
9. Intervention
State of New York's interest arising
out of its responsibility for making initial determinations whether individuals
are disabled for purposes of federal supplemental security income and old age
survivors and disability insurance programs and threat of possible federal
take-over of the state's program if it refused to follow regulations it believed to
be illegal adequately supported state's
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right of intervention in action challenging legality of standards by which claims
for disability benefits are evaluated.
Dixon v. Heckler, D.C.N.Y.1984, 589
F.Supp. 1512.
10. Consultative examinations
Medical evidence that supplemental
security income claimant may have suffered from anxiety and nerves and a lot
of stress, along with her own testimony
of mental problems, may have been
enough to require consultative psychological examination. McCall v. Bowen,
C.A.11 (Ala.) 1988, 846 F.2d 1317.
,
,
, ..
XKTU
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Where neurological evaluation of s o
cial security disability benefits claimant's headaches was necessary and psychiatric or psychological and orthopedic
examination were necessary in order to
properly evaluate her anxiety and back
and toe impairments and to determine
whether her complaints of pain were
psychological in origin, administrative
law judge erred by failing to order consultative examinations. Dozier v. Heckler, C.A.Ark.1985, 754 F.2d 274.

Rehabilitation services

(a) Referral for rehabilitation services

It is declared to be the policy of the Congress lhat disabled
individuals applying for a determination of disability, and disabled
individuals who are entitled to child's insurance benefits, widow's
insurance benefits, or widower's insurance benefits, shall be
promptly referred to the State agency or agencies administering or
supervising the administration of the State plan approved under
Title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 720 et seq.]
for necessary vocational rehabilitation services, to the end that the
maximum number of such individuals may be rehabilitated into
productive activity.
(b) Deductions on account of refusal to accept rehabilitation services

(1) Deductions, in such amounts and at such time or times as the
Secretary shall determine, shall be made from any payment or
payments under this subchapter to which an individual is entitled,
until the total of such deductions equals such individual's benefit or
benefits under sections 402 and 423 of this title for any month in
which such individual, if a child who has attained the age of
eighteen and is entitled to child's insurance benefils, a widow,
widower, surviving divorced wife, or surviving divorced husband
who has not attained age 60, or an individual entitled to disability
insurance benefits, refuses without good cause to accept rehabilitation services available to him under a State plan approved under
1351
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Title I of the Rehabilitation Ait of 1973 129 U.S.C.A. § 720 el seq.J.
Any individual who is a member or adherent of any recognized
church or religious sect which teaches its members or adherents to
rely solely, in the treatment and cure of any physical or mental
impairment, upon prayer or spiritual means through the application and use of the tenets or teachings of such church or sect, and
who, solely because of his adherence to the teachings or tenets of
such church, or sect, refuses to accept rehabilitation services available to him under a State plan approved under Title I of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 720 et seq.], shall, lor the
purposes of the first sentence of this subsection, be deemed to have
done so with good cause.
(2) Deductions shall be made from any child's insurance benefit
to which a child who has attained the age of eighteen is entitled or
from any mother's or father's insurance benefit to which a person is
entitled, until the total of such deductions equals such child's
insurance benefit or benefits or such mother's or father's insurance
benefits or benefits under section 402 of this title for any month in
which such child or person entitled to mother's or father's insurance benefits is married to an individual who is entitled to disability insurance benefits and in which such individual refuses to accept
rehabilitation services and a deduction, on account of such refusal,
is imposed under paragraph (1) of this subsection. If both this
paragraph and paragraph (3) of this subsection are applicable to a
child's insurance benefit for any month, only an amount equal to
such benefit shall be deducted.
(3) Deductions shall be made IIOIH any wife's, husband's, or
child's insurance benefit, based on the wages and self-employment
income of an individual entitled to disability insurance benefits, to
which a wife, divorced wife, husband, divorced husband, or child is
entitled, until the total of such deductions equals such wife's,
husband's, or child's insurance benefit or benefits under section 402
of this title for any month in which the individual, on the basis of
whose wages and self-employment income such benefit was payable, refuses to accept rehabilitation services and deductions, on
account of such refusal, aie imposed under paragiaph (1) nf this
subsection
(4) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply to an\ child
entitled to benefits under section 402(d) of this title, if he has
attained the age of 18 but has not attained the age of 22, for any
month during which he is a full-time elementary or secondary
school student (as defined and determined under section 402(d) of
this title).
(c) "Period of trial work" defined

(1) The term "period of trial work", with respect to an individual
entitled to benefits under section 423, 402(d), 402(e), or 402(f) of
IIS?
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this title, means a period of months beginning and ending as
provided in paragraphs (3) and (4).
(2) For purposes of sections 416(i) and 423 of this title, any
services rendered by an individual during a period of trial work
shall be deemed not to have been rendered by such individual in
determining whether his disability has ceased in a month during
such period. For purposes of this subsection the term "sendees"
means activity which is performed for remuneration or gain or is
determined by the Secretary to be of a type normally performed for
remuneration or gain.
(3) A period of trial work for any individual shall begin with the
month in which he becomes entitled to disability insurance benefits, or, in the case of an individual entitled to benefits under
section 402(d) of this title who has attained the age of eighteen, with
the month in which he becomes entitled to such benefits or the
month in which he attains the age of eighteen, whichever is later,
or, in the case of an individual entitled to widow's or widower's
insurance benefits under section 402(e) or (f) of this title who
became entitled to such benefits prior to attaining age 60, with the
month in which such individual becomes so entitled. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, no period of trial work may begin
for any individual prior to the beginning of the month following
September 1960; and no such period may begin for an individual in
a period of disability of such individual in which he had a previous
period of trial work.
(4) A period of trial work for any individual shall end with the
close of whichever of the following months is the earlier:
(A) the ninth month, beginning on or after the first day of
such period, in which the individual renders services (whether
or not such nine months are consecutive); or
(B) the month in which his disability (as defined in section
423(d) of this title) ceases (as determined after application of
paragraph (2) of this subsection).
(5) In the case of an individual who becomes entitled to benefits
under section 423 of this title for any month as provided in clause
(ii) of subsection (a)(1) of such section, the preceding provisions of
this subsection shall not apply with respect to services in any month
beginning with the first month for which he is so entitled and
ending with the first month thereafter for which he is not entitled
to benefits under section 423 of this title.
(d) Costs of rehabilitation services from trust funds

(1) For purposes of making vocational rehabilitation services
more readily available to disabled individuals who are—
(A) entitled to disability insurance benefits under section 423
of this title,
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Note 4

4. Remand
Although work which social security
disability benefits claimant performed
u-i • r\cc- C\T ••
I £ u UT*
while in Office of Vocational Rehabihtation program to qualify for workers
compensation payments was performed
for "gain" for purpose of determining
whether disability had ceased, since
record did not conclusively establish pe-

riod of attendance the administrative
law judge, on remand, was to determine
P e n o d °/ c * a ™ a n t s attendance and evidence of attendance during dates within
^
^
±e
WQrk
i o d W(fre n Q t
c o n s i d e r e d in determining whether disability had ceased or failed to exist in a
month during that period. Rivera v.
Secretary of Health, Ed. and Welfare]
D.C.N.Y.1981, 513 F.Supp. 194.

§ 4 2 3 . Disability insurance benefit payments
(a) Disability insurance benefits
(1) Every individual who—
(A) is insured for disability insurance benefits (as determined
under subsection (c)(1) of this section),
(B) has not attained retirement age (as defined in section
416(/) of this title),
(C) has filed application for disability insurance benefits, and
(D) is under a disability (as defined in subsection (d) of this
section),
shall be entitled to a disability insurance benefit (i) for each month
beginning with the first month after his waiting period (as defined
in subsection (c)(2) of this section) in which he becomes so entitled
to such insurance benefits, or (ii) for each month beginning with
the first month during all of which he is under a disability and in
which he becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits, but only if
he was entitled to disability insurance benefits which terminated, or
had a period of disability (as defined in section 416(i) of this title)
which ceased, within the 60-month period preceding the first
month in which he is under such disability, and ending with the
month preceding whichever of the following months is the earliest:
the month in which he dies, the month in which he attains retirement age (as defined in section 416(/) of this title), or, subject to
subsection (e) of this section, the termination month. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, the termination month for any individual
shall be the third month following the month in which his disability
ceases; except that, in the case of an individual who has a period of
trial work which ends as determined by application of section
422(c)(4)(A) of this title, the termination month shall be the earlier
of (I) the third month following the earliest month after the end of
such period of trial work with respect to which such individual is
determined to no longer be suffering from a disabling physical or
mental impairment, or (II) the third month following the earliest
month in which such individual engages or is determined able to
engage in substantial gainful activity, but in no event earlier than
the first month occurring after the 36 months following such period
of trial work in which he engages or is determined able to engage in
substantial gainful activity. No payment under this paragraph may
1362
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be made to an individual who would not meet the definition of
disability in subsection (d) of this section except for paragraph
(1)(B) thereof for any month in which he engages in substantial
gainful activity, and no payment may be made for such month
under subsection (b), (c), or (d) of section 402 of this title to any
person on the basis of the wages and self-employment income of
such individual. In the case of a deceased individual, the requirement of subparagraph (C) may be satisfied by an application for
benefits filed with respect to such individual within 3 months after
the month in which he died.
(2) Except as provided in section 402(q) of this title and section
415(b)(2)(A)(ii) of this title, such individual's disability insurance
benefit for any month shall be equal to his primary insurance
amount for such month determined under section 415 of this title
as though he had attained age 62 in—
(A) the first month of his waiting period, or
(B) in any case in which clause (ii) of paragraph (1) of this
subsection is applicable, the first month for which he becomes
entitled to such disability insurance benefits,
and as though he had become entitled to old-age insurance benefits
in the month in which the application for disability insurance
benefits was filed and he was entitled to an old-age insurance
benefit for each month for which (pursuant to subsection (b) of this
section) he was entitled to a disability insurance benefit. For the
purposes of the preceding sentence, in the case of an individual who
attained age 62 in or before the first month referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B) of such sentence, as the case may be, the elapsed
years referred to in section 415(b)(3) of this title shall not include
the year in which he attained age 62, or any year thereafter.
(b) Filing application

An application for disability insurance benefits filed before the
first month in which the applicant satisfies the requirements for
such benefits (as prescribed in subsection (a)(1) of this section)
shall be deemed a valid application (and shall be deemed to have
been filed in such first month) only if the applicant satisfies the
requirements for such benefits before the Secretary makes a final
decision on the application and no request under section 405(b) of
this title for notice and opportunity for a hearing thereon is made,
or if such a request is made, before a decision based upon the
evidence adduced at the hearing is made (regardless of whether
such decision becomes the final decision of the Secretary). An
individual who would have been entitled to a disability insurance
benefit for any month had he filed application therefor before the
end of such month shall be entitled to such benefit for such month
if such application is filed before the end of the 12th month
immediately succeeding such month.
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(c) Definitions; insured status; waiting period

For purposes of this section—
(1) An individual shall be insured for disability insurance
benefits in any month if—
(A) he would have been a fully insured individual (as
defined in section 414 of this title) had he attained age 62
and filed application for benefits under section 402(a) of
this title on the first day of such month, and
(B)(i) he had not less than 20 quarters of coverage during
the 40-quarter period which ends with the quarter in which
such month occurred, or
(il) if such month ends before the quarter in which he
attains (or would attain) age 31, not less than one-half (and
not less than 6) of the quarters during the period ending
with the quarter in which such month occurred and beginning after he attained the age of 21 were quarters of
coverage, or (if the number of quarters in such period is
less than 12) not less than 6 of the quarters in the 12-quarter period ending with such quarter were quarters of coverage, or
(ill) in the case of an individual (not otherwise insured
under clause (i)) who, by reason of section 416(i)(3)(B)(ii)
of this title, had a prior period of disability that began
during a period before the quarter in which he or she
attained age 31, not less than one-half of the quarters
beginning after such individual attained age 21 and ending
with the quarter in which such month occurs are quarters
of coverage, or (if the number of quarters in such period is
less than 12) not less than 6 of the quarters in the 12-quarter period ending with such quarter are quarters of coverage;
except that the provisions of subparagraph (B) of this paragraph shall not apply in the case of an individual who is blind
(within the meaning of "blindness" as defined in section
416(i)(l) of this title). For purposes of subparagraph (B) of this
paragraph, when the number of quarters in any period is an
odd number, such number shall be reduced by one, and a
quarter shall not be counted as part of any period if any part of
such quarter was included in a period of disability unless such
quarter was a quarter of coverage.
(2) The term "waiting period" means, in the case of any
application for disability insurance benefits, the earliest period
of five consecutive calendar months—
(A) throughout which the individual with respect to
whom such application is filed has been under a disability,
and
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(B)(i) which begins not earlier than with the first day of
the seventeenth month before the month in which such
application is filed if such individual is insured for disability insurance benefits in such seventeenth month, or (ii) if
he is not so insured in such month, which begins not
earlier than with the first day of the first month after such
seventeenth month in which he is so insured.
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph, no
waiting period may begin for any individual before January 1,
1957.
(d) "Disability" defined

(1) The term "disability" means—
(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months; or
(B) in the case of an individual who has attained the age of
55 and is blind (within the meaning of "blindness" as defined in
section 416(i)(l) of this title), inability by reason of such blindness to engage in substantial gainful activity requiring skills or
abilities comparable to those of any gainful activity in which he
has previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A)—
(A) An individual shall be determined to be under a disability
only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are
of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous
work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or
whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), "work which exists in the national economy" means work
which exists in significant numbers either in the region where
such individual lives or in several regions of the country.
(B) In determining whether an individual's physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a sufficient medical
severity that such impairment or impairments could be the
basis of eligibility under this section, the Secretary shall consider the combined effect of all of the individual's impairments
without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered
separately, would be of such severity. If the Secretary does
find a medically severe combination of impairments, the com1365
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bined impact of the impairments shall be considered throughout the disability determination process.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, a "physical or mental impairment" is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.
(4) The Secretary shall by regulations prescribe the criteria for
determining when services performed or earnings derived from
services demonstrate an individual's ability to engage in substantial
gainful activity. No individual who is blind shall be regarded as
having demonstrated an ability to engage in substantial gainful
activity on the basis of earnings that do not exceed the exempt
amount under section 403(f)(8) of this title which is applicable to
individuals described in subparagraph (D) thereof. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (2), an individual whose services or
earnings meet such criteria shall, except for purposes of section
422(c) of this title, be found not to be disabled. In determining
whether an individual is able to engage in substantial gainful
activity by reason of his earnings, where his disability is sufficiently
severe to result in a functional limitation requiring assistance in
order for him to work, there shall be excluded from such earnings
an amount equal to the cost (to such individual) of any attendant
care services, medical devices, equipment, prostheses, and similar
items and services (not including routine drugs or routine medical
services unless such drugs or services are necessary for the control
of the disabling condition) which are necessary (as determined by
the Secretary in regulations) for that purpose, whether or not such
assistance is also needed to enable him to carry out his normal
daily functions; except that the amounts to be excluded shall be
subject to such reasonable limits as the Secretary may prescribe.
(5)(A) An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the
existence thereof as the Secretary may require. An individual's
statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability as defined in this section; there must be
medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable
clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be
expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which,
when considered with all evidence required to be furnished under
this paragraph (including statements of the individual or his physician as to the intensity and persistence of such pain or other
symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
medical signs and findings), would lead to a conclusion that the
individual is under a disability. Objective medical evidence of pain
or other symptoms established by medically acceptable clinical or
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laboratory techniques (for example, deteriorating nerve or muscle
tissue) must be considered in reaching a conclusion as to whether
the individual is under a disability. Any non-Federal hospital,
clinic, laboratory, or other provider of medical services, or physician not in the employ of the Federal Government, which supplies
medical evidence required and requested by the Secretary under
this paragraph shall be entitled to payment from the Secretary for
the reasonable cost of providing such evidence.
(B) In making any determination with respect to whether an
individual is under a disability or continues to be under a disability,
the Secretary shall consider all evidence available in such individual's case record, and shall develop a complete medical history of at
least the preceding twelve months for any case in which a determination is made that the individual is not under a disability. In
making any determination the Secretary shall make every reasonable effort to obtain from the individual's treating physician (or
other treating health care provider) all medical evidence, including
diagnostic tests, necessary in order to properly make such determination, prior to evaluating medical evidence obtained from any
other source on a consultative basis.
(6)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter,
any physical or mental impairment which arises in connection with
the commission by an individual (after October 19, 1980) of an
offense which constitutes a felony under applicable law and for
which such individual is subsequently convicted, or which is aggravated in connection with such an offense (but only to the extent so
aggravated), shall not be considered in determining whether an
individual is under a disability.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, any
physical or mental impairment which arises in connection with an
individual's confinement in a jail, prison, or other penal institution
or correctional facility pursuant to such individual's conviction of
an offense (committed after October 19, 1980) constituting a felony
under applicable law, or which is aggravated in connection with
such a confinement (but only to the extent so aggravated), shall not
be considered in determining whether such individual is under a
disability for purposes of benefits payable for any month during
which such individual is so confined.
(e) Engaging in substantial gainful activity
(1) No benefit shall be payable under subsection (d)(l)(B)(ii),
(d)(6)(A)(ii), (d)(6)(B), (e)(l)(B)(ii), or (f)(l)(B)(ii) of section 402 of
this title or under subsection (a)(1) of this section to an individual
for any month, after the third month, in which he engages in
substantial gainful activity during the 36-month period following
the end of his trial work period determined by application of
section 422(c)(4)(A) of this title.
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(2) No benefit shall be payable under section 402 of this title on
the basis of the wages and self-employment income of an individual
entitled to a benefit under subsection (a)(1) of this section for any
month for which the benefit of such individual under subsection
(a)(1) of this section is not payable under paragraph (1).
(f) Standard of review for termination of disability benefits

A recipient of benefits under this subchapter or subchapter XVIII
of this chapter based on the disability of any individual may be
determined not to be entitled to such benefits on the basis of a
finding that the physical or mental impairment on the basis of
which such benefits are provided has ceased, does not exist, or is
not disabling only if such finding is supported by—
(1) substantial evidence which demonstrates that—
(A) there has been any medical improvement in the
individual's impairment or combination of impairments
(other than medical improvement which is not related to
the individual's ability to work), and
(B) the individual is now able to engage in substantial
gainful activity; or
(2) substantial evidence which—
(A) consists of new medical evidence and (in a case to
which clause (ii)(II)! does not apply) a new assessment of
the individual's residual functional capacity, and demonstrates that—
(i) although the individual has not improved medically, he or she is nonetheless a beneficiary of advances
in medical or vocational therapy or technology (related
to the individual's ability to work), and
(ii) the individual is now able to engage in substantial gainful activity, or
(B) demonstrates that—
(i) although the individual has not improved medically, he or she has undergone vocational therapy (related to the individual's ability to work), and
(ii) the requirements of subclause (I) or (II) of subparagraph (A)(ii)2 are met; or
(3) substantial evidence which demonstrates that, as determined on the basis of new or improved diagnostic techniques
or evaluations, the individual's impairment or combination of
impairments is not as disabling as it was considered to be at the
time of the most recent prior decision that he or she was under
a disability or continued to be under a disability, and that
therefore the individual is able to engage in substantial gainful
activity; or
(4) substantial evidence (which may be evidence on the
record at the time any prior determination of the entitlement to
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benefits based on disability was made, or newly obtained evidence which relates to that determination) which demonstrates
that a prior determination was in error.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require a determination that a recipient of benefits under this subchapter or subchapter XVIII of this chapter based on an individual's disabilily is
entitled to such benefits if the prior determination was fraudulently
obtained or if the individual is engaged in substantial gainful
activity, cannot be located, or fails, without good cause, to cooperate in a review of the entitlement to such benefits or to follow
prescribed treatment which would be expected to restore his or her
ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. In making for
purposes of the preceding sentence any determination relating to
fraudulent behavior by any individual or failure by any individual
without good cause to cooperate or to take any required action, the
Secretary shall specifically take into account any physical, mental,
educational, or linguistic limitation such individual may have (including any lack of facility with the English language). Any determination under this section shall be made on the basis of all the
evidence available in the individual's case file, including new evidence concerning the individual's prior or current condition which
is presented by the individual or secured by the Secretary. Any
determination made under this section shall be made on the basis
of the weight of the evidence and on a neutral basis with regard to
the individual's condition, without any initial inference as to the
presence or absence of disability being drawn from the fact that the
individual has previously been determined to be disabled. For
purposes of this subsection, a benefit under this subchapter is based
on an individual's disability if it is a disability insurance benefit, a
child's, widow's, or widower's insurance benefit based on disability,
or a mother's or father's insurance benefit based on the disability of
the mother's or father's child who has attained age 16.
(g) Continued payment of disability benefits during appeal
(1) In any case where—

(A) an individual is a recipient of disability insurance benefits, or of child's, widow's, or widower's insurance benefits
based on disability,
(B) the physical or mental impairment on the basis of which
such benefits are payable is found to have ceased, not to have
existed, or to no longer be disabling, and as a consequence such
individual is determined not to be entitled to such benefits, and
(C) a timely request for a hearing under section 421(d) of this
title, or for an administrative review prior to such hearing, is
pending with respect to the determination that he is not so
entitled,
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